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ISSN 1109-6691 Editorial 
  The South-Eastern European Monetary History Network (SEEMHN) is a 
community of financial historians, economists and statisticians, established in April 2006 
at the initiation of the Bulgarian National Bank and the Bank of Greece. Its objective is to 
spread knowledge on the economic history of the region in the context of European 
experience with a specific focus on financial, monetary and banking history. The First 
and the Second Annual Conferences were held in Sofia (BNB) in 2006 and in Vienna 
(OeNB) in 2007. Additionally, the SEEMHN Data Collection Task Force aims at 
establishing a historical data base with 19
th and 20
th century financial and monetary data 
for countries in the region. A set of data has already been published as an annex to the 
2007 conference proceedings, released by the OeNB (2008, Workshops, no 13). 
On 13-14 March 2008, the Third Annual Conference was held in Athens, hosted 
by the Bank of Greece. The conference was dedicated to Banking and Finance in South-
Eastern Europe: Lessons of Historical Experience. It was attended by representatives of 
the Albanian, Austrian, Belgian, Bulgarian, German, Greek, Romanian, Russian, Serbian 
and Turkish central banks, as well as participants from a number of universities and 
research institutions. Professor Michael Bordo delivered the key note speech on Growing 
up to Financial Stability. The participants presented, reviewed and assessed the 
experience of SE Europe with financial development, banking and central banking from a 
comparative and historical perspective. 
The 4
th Annual SEEMHN Conference will be hosted by the National Serbian 
Bank on 27
th March 2009 in Belgrade. The topic of the Conference will be Economic and 
Financial Stability in SE Europe in a Historical and Comparative Perspective. 
  The papers presented at the 2008 SEEMHN Conference are being made available 
to a wider audience in the Working Paper Series of the Bank of Greece. Here we present 
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In the first thirty years of its operations, key functions of the privileged National Bank of 
the Kingdom of Serbia (1884-1914) were those of a creditor of the economy, issuer of 
currency and banker to the government. The National Bank’s success in the performance 
of its functions was mainly determined by the state of government finances. Peace and 
stability are a prerequisite for economic development and when we look at Serbia’s 
history from 1884 to 1914, all we see is a chain of wars. In such circumstances, Serbia 
did make significant economic headway, and the National Bank did do its best to achieve 
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1. Introduction 
Monetary policy objectives and instruments used by the privileged National Bank 
of the Kingdom of Serbia (1884-1914)
1 are a logical outcome of its three key functions: 
creditor of the economy, issuer of currency and banker to the government. At the time, 
most other central banks performed similar functions.  
Pursuant to the 1883 Law on the National Bank, the Bank’s objective was “to 
promote trade and economic activity by providing access to cheap capital and viable 
credit arrangements”. This objective was incorporated into all relevant legislation adopted 
prior to passing of the 1920 Law. Until the end of World War I, the National Bank’s 
primary activity was credit expansion. Money bureaux (as credit institutions) kept their 
privileged status until 1920. Namely, they used to borrow from the National Bank at an 
interest rate, which was around 5 percentage points lower than the prevailing market 
rates. The discount rate of the National Bank was kept at around 6% and was raised 
several times throughout the period under review in order to ease political unrest. A more 
radical measure – full suspension of gold credits for over one year – was implemented in 
1908 during the Annexation Crisis, when Serbia experienced a massive outpouring of 
gold amid fears of the potential outbreak of war. The National Bank did not change the 
level of its rate to ease the pressure on gold reserves (normally lower than the market 
interest rate), but rather to encourage commercial banking and create conditions for the 
economic development of the country. 
As an issuing institution, the National Bank was responsible for the stability of 
the national currency – issuing of banknotes and maintaining gold and silver 
convertibility of the dinar at a fixed parity. The first gold-backed 100-dinar banknote was 
issued immediately after the establishment of the National Bank in 1884. However, as 
these banknotes could not remain in circulation, silver-backed 10-dinar banknotes were 
issued in 1885, marking the introduction of bimetallism. Bimetallism remained the basis 
of Serbia’s monetary system well until the end of World War I. Due to Serbia’s poor 
production capacities, as well as the increasing budget deficit and foreign debt, gold 
                                                 
1 In the period under review, Serbia was ruled by three kings from two Serbian dynasties: Milan Obrenović 
(1882-1889), Aleksandar Obrenović (1889-1903) and Petar I Karađorđević (1903-1921).   8
reserves could no longer sustain the gold convertibility of the domestic currency at a 
fixed parity. Currency exchange was performed against an additional payment of the 
Agio. As the difference between domestic money (silver-backed 10-dinar banknotes) and 
gold  which was used for the settlement of international obligations, widened further, the 
Agio was an indicator of the depreciation of the dinar against gold. At times, the National 
Bank could not eliminate the Agio by direct interventions, i.e. by selling gold, but it did 
manage to moderate oscillations in its value. Although the price of the dinar was slightly 
lower in international money markets than at home, it remained a relatively stable 
currency.  
The National Bank’s efforts to preserve the value of the domestic currency often 
clashed with its function of the banker to the central government. Financing 
government’s emergent spending needs, at times of war and hardship, was made the top 
priority of the National Bank. To finance the budget deficits that protracted over 25 years 
(1878-1903), the government resorted to substantial borrowing from the National Bank. 
In 1898, the government debt to the National Bank was nearly three times higher than the 
total debt of all money bureaux taken together. In 1903, the relations between the 
National Bank and the government were re-defined in the context of a new set of 
principles. In particular, the government conducted strict supervision of budget revenue 
and expenditure flows. It was also defined that its borrowing from the National Bank 
should be only temporary and short-term. As a result, the National Bank of Serbia 
managed to be more successful in implementing both credit policy measures and those 
aimed at stabilizing the dinar. 
 
2. The National Bank: the Creditor 
Prior to the establishment of the National Bank, the scale of lending in the 
Kingdom of Serbia was quite modest. Credit needs were largely covered by mutual 
lending between craftsmen and merchants, while the interest rate applied exceeded the 
officially authorized ceiling of 12% p.a. (reaching in some instances as much as 50%). 
Faster development of trade and craftsmanship felt victim to the dearth of capital, and 
although various crafts were up and running, industrial manufacturing was practically   9
non-existent. The main Serbian products were cereals and livestock. Exporters used 
domestic capital and credits to the extent that the general circumstances allowed. They 
often entered into partnerships with merchants from Zemun, Mitrovica and Budapest to 
procure necessary liquidity. As the importers were mostly commissionaries of Viennesse 
and Budapest stores, they borrowed abroad.   
With a view to offering better credit terms, the government extended loans from 
the school and single mother funds, as well as from guardianship funds, which were 
under the remit of courts (mortgage-backed loans with repayment period up to three years 
and at a rate of 6% p.a.). These were small funds managed centrally by the Fund 
Administration. The bulk of credits were made available in Belgrade (51%) and small 
Serbian towns (36%). Paradoxically, the remaining 13% were distributed to farmers who 
made up 96% of the total population.
2 Merchants and craftsmen borrowed from money 
bureaux founded by private capital. Despite the small size of funds, money bureaux were 
proved beneficial for the domestic economy at times of instability faced by the Prva 
srpska banka
3 and the Fund Administration. On the eve of the establishment of the 
National Bank, seven money bureaux operated in Serbia and provided credits to their 
members. Besides money bureaux, district savings banks also operated and extended 
credits to the farmers with a repayment period up to 3 years and at a rate of 7% p.a.  By 
setting up savings banks across districts and making the sources of finance more 
accessible, the government intended to even out the distribution of credits to the benefit 
of the farmers. 
Yet, seven money bureaux, district savings banks and the Fund Administration 
could not fully meet Serbia’s credit needs. Hence, one of the main tasks of the authorities 
was to establish a central credit institution not only to promote trade and economic 
activity by providing cheap money and viable credit arrangements, but also to give a 
                                                 
2 Milić, Danica (1994, p. 81). 
3 The first bank in Serbia, called “Prva srpska banka“, was founded in 1869 as a private capital venture. 
Failures in the stock exchange deals and, more importantly, ill luck in the railway construction abroad 
(Rijeka-Karlovac railway) and an extension of credits, led to its bankruptcy in 1871. As one of the bank’s 
founders was the Pest-based French-Hungarian Bank, turmoil in the Vienesse and Pest money markets only 
precipitated the bank’s collapse (see, Milić, Danica 1994, p.81). The bankruptcy of the most renowned 
merchants – members of the bank’s management board - had an adverse effect on the further development 
of banking in Serbia. In fact, for several years no one took the initiative to set up a new bank.    10
boost to public finance. The solution to this challenge was to set up an issuing institution 
which, based on gold and silver withdrawn from circulation, would issue a 
proportionately larger quantity of banknotes to increase domestic capital two to three 
times and, consequently, make credits cheaper.  
From the beginning of its operations in 1884 to 1920, the primary function of the 
National Bank was to organize credit arrangements (see Chart 1). Pursuant to the Law 
and Statutes of 1883, including the 1885 amendments thereto, the Bank’s objective was 
“to promote trade and economic activity by providing access to cheap capital and viable 
credit arrangements, and to organize the domestic market by discounting bills of 
exchange and warranties issued against pledged Serbian products, and extending loans 
against collateral of government bonds”. According to the said regulations, the Bank 
“could not place into circulation banknotes more than 2.5 times the amount of gold and/or 
silver kept in its vaults”. Banknotes were backed by 92-day maturity bills of exchange, 
short-term warranties and government and public loan coupons with maturity of no 
longer than 92 days, as well as government bonds in the amount of up to 75% of their 
market value. 
The National Bank also extended paper and Lombard loans. Two years after it 
had started operations, it began granting current account loans, taking into account its 
credit portfolio liquidity. The National Bank exercised its most important legal and 
statutory role of placing banknotes into circulation by discounting the bills of exchange of 
merchants, industrialists, craftsmen and even the money bureaux. In order to be able to 
meet its obligation to exchange banknotes for coins, the Bank discounted only short-term 
bills of exchange. For the same reason, it only discounted the most secure bills of 
exchange available in the market, i.e. “at demand” bills, bearing at least two authorized 
signatures. 
The creditworthiness of each signatory to the bill submitted for discount was 
closely scrutinized. Moreover, all credits were reviewed in annual joint meetings of the 
Managing and Discount Board, which considered the property holdings of each credit 
beneficiary as well as the use of approved funds to ensure that the National Bank’s credits 
were not used to finance consumption. In case that any unfavourable data were to become   11
known, the credit was either reduced or cancelled altogether. The Management Board 
also considered statistical data on bills of exchange protested with the Belgrade 
Commercial Court, which pointed to the Bank’s scrutiny of its borrowers. The Bank, 






































































































































Collateralized loans Discounting bills of exchange Current account loans
Chart 1




As seen in Chart 2, the bill of exchange credits, however, recorded only modest 
growth, while after 1908 they were declining. This was due to several reasons. First, as 
the number of large trading and industrial enterprises was limited, high-quality bill of 
exchange material (“trading” bills of exchange) was scarce. Moreover, despite being 
offered a lower-than-market interest rate, traders and craftsmen resorted to the Bank’s 
credits comparatively rarely, as the Bank did not allow the bills of exchange to be repaid 
in instalments, but only redeemed in full. On the other hand, due to economic and 
political problems, all money bureaux introduced the possibility of the repayment of the 
bills of exchange in instalments. Traders and craftsmen, therefore, frequently opted for   12
borrowing at a higher interest rate, but subject to easier terms of repayment. It should be 
also noted that the National Bank was subject to a legal limitation regarding the amount 
of resources for lending to the trade and craftsmanship sectors. Due to the limitation on 
the issue of silver-backed banknotes, each year the Bank found itself faced with the same 
problems during the exports season when money demand was at its peak. As the Bank 
could not breach the above limitation, it repeatedly had to suspend the discounting of bills 
of exchange precisely at the time when silver-backed banknotes were in the highest 
demand. The problem became more pronounced as trade and craftsmanship developed 
further. The decline in the bill of exchange credits after 1908 resulted mainly from the 
fact that a large number of money bureaux decided not to take the Bank’s credits. In order 
to use these credits they had to agree to a limitation of the maximum interest rate charged 
from their clients (three percentage points above the Bank rate).  
 
Number of Borrowers in Respect of Discounted Bills of 





































































































































Source: Monograph of the National Bank 1884-1934 (1935).
 
   13
Lombard (collateralized) loans were another avenue for the Bank to issue its 
banknotes. For the issuing institution, Lombard loan operations were secondary in 
significance, not quite on a par with discount operations, and were subject to the main 
principles of issuing institutions, i.e. safety and liquidity. Lombard loans were extended 
for a maximum of three months, against collateral in gold or silver, Serbian state bonds, 
government-guaranteed bonds and state Treasury coupons with a maturity of no more 
than 92 days. The loans extended by the National Bank could equal no more than 75% of 
the market price of these security instruments. 
As the only collateral accepted by the Bank was government bonds almost fully 
invested abroad, as well as government guaranteed bonds, which were very few, 
collateralized loans made up only a very small portion of the Bank’s balance sheet. In the 
initial years of the National Bank’s operations, collateralized loans exhibited low rates. 
Thereafter, they quickly picked up and, until 1903, moved at around RSD 1 million. After 
1903, the sum of collateralized loans in the balance sheet swelled, as this item came to 
include the stock of loans of the Fund Administration which resorted to the National 
Bank’s credits, placing its debentures or government bonds as collateral. The 
management of the Bank believed that Lombard operations could have developed just 
like any other bank operations if the legal regulations had permitted the Bank to accept as 
collateral other (nearly) secure domestic assets, which were to appear later in the market.
4  
In order to stimulate the money market and consolidate its own position, in 1886 
the National Bank decided to allow money bureaux to disburse current account overdrafts 
against coverage in bills of exchange equalling 125% of the debt (see Charts 3 and 4).  
The debt had to be settled at the end of the quarter. Maximum credit amount to be granted 
to a single money bureau was one-half of the subscribed capital, on condition that the 
Bank supervised such money bureau’s operations. The Bank also approved current 
account loans to strong trading firms against coverage in bills of exchange equalling 
133% of the debt. Current accounts were particularly adequate as they also functioned as 
gyro accounts that the National Bank did not maintain at the time.  
 
                                                 
4 See, the monograph of the privileged National Bank of the Kingdom of Serbia 1884-1909 (1909, p. 125).   14
Approved Loans in Respect of Discounted Bills of Exchange 











































































































































Movements in current account overdrafts were aligned with the development of 
banking institutions in Serbia (see Charts 5 and 6). In the early first years of the National 
Bank, the number of banking institutions was low but growing. Current account loans 
followed suit. While in 1887 they barely exceeded 80 thousand dinars, in 1908 they 
reached close to 12 million dinars.   15


































































































































Money bureaus Other economy
Chart 4




It is also worth noting that money bureaux (as well as various exporting and 
industrial firms) received preferential treatment from the National Bank from 1886 until 
end-1919. For instance, they were granted credits at an interest rate which was around 5 
percentage points lower than the prevailing market rates (although as of 1892 there were 
no facilities for borrowing in gold). The Bank, in fact, wanted to stimulate the 
development of commercial banking and to create conditions favourable for the country’s 
economic development. In 1884, Serbia had only seven money bureaux with a total 
capital of 3.25 million dinars.
5 In 1886, their number rose to 21 and in 1890 to 42, while 
their total capital climbed to around 12 million dinars.  
As new money bureaux were constantly being incorporated, their number reached 
140 in 1907 and their total capital came close to 34 million dinars. However, when the 
bureaux began to be founded for political reasons and due to conflicts within 
craftsmanship guilds, the Bank tried to discourage this process by not approving loans to 
                                                 
5 See, the History of the Serbian People VI, Belgrade (1982, p. 17).   16
newly founded bureaux, but only to such bureaux which in a two- to three-year period 
recorded good operating results. 
In a way, money bureaux were the branches of the National Bank, as it is through 
these bureaux that the Bank performed payments and collections in the provincial Serbia, 
and they were the main source of information on persons and firms financed by the Bank. 
Once a year, it conducted supervision of operations of the money bureaux with which it 
did business. The report on the supervision conducted by the Bank’s general manager 
formed the basis for taking decisions on lending to a particular bureau.  
Credits approved by the Bank to money bureaux were either regular or 
extraordinary. Regular credits were approved to finance regular operations throughout the 
year, but bureaux could be requested to settle the debt every three months. Extraordinary 
credits were extended on a quarterly basis only, at the outset of the exports season, to 
bureaux catering to exporters. 
In time, the original purpose of money bureaux, namely mutual crediting of 
members and, subsequently, non-members though at a somewhat higher interest rate was 
abandoned and the bureaux, as private joint stock companies, grew into genuine credit 
institutions. They contributed to the accumulation of domestic savings and, consequently, 
to an increase in working capital necessary for the trade and craftsmanship sectors. In 
1895, savings deposits rose to 12.3 million dinars (5.1 in Belgrade and 7.2 in the rest of 
the country), while by 1907 they reached around 47 million dinars. 
Throughout the 1884–1914 period, the Bank rate remained lower than the free 
market interest rate (see charts 7 and 8). Such low interest rate was applied by the Bank 
primarily on credits granted to money bureaux as a credit policy instrument to foster the 
development of trade and craftsmanship. On several occasions, the Bank had to suspend 
the granting of the discount and collateralized loans, but for periods no longer than one to 
three months. Silver loans were suspended for two main reasons: first, due to the legal 
limitation on the issue of banknotes and, second, due to high government borrowing form 
the National Bank. Gold loans, on the other hand, were suspended at times of drastic 
reductions in the Bank’s metal backing which threatened to fall below the legally 
prescribed minimum. In 1908, for instance, political problems caused by the annexation   17
of Bosnia and Herzegovina, led to a massive outflow of gold and withdrawal of savings 
deposits, and, consequently, to a suspension of gold loans until June 1910. 
 




















































































































By keeping its interest rate at a low level, the Bank intended to lower the market 
interest rate and the high cost of borrowing. At the outset of the National Bank’s 
operations, the interest rate on prime bills of exchange ranged from 9% to 11%, but 
declined gradually over the subsequent years to 6–8% in Belgrade and 8–10% in the rest 
of Serbia. As of 1895, the free market interest rate picked up again ranging from 8–10% 
in Belgrade and to 10–12% elsewhere in Serbia. With occasional departures, it remained 
within this range up until World War I.  
The National Bank’s interest rate followed a different path. When the National 
Bank was established, it was decided to set the interest rate on discounting bills of 
exchange at 5.5% and the interest rate on collateralized loans at 6.5% p.a. Despite being 
two times lower than the money market interest rate, the discount rate did not succeed to   18
decrease the cost of capital, as banknotes obtained in respect of credits were immediately 
exchanged for gold, thus eroding the Bank’s metal backing. This prompted the Bank to 
raise the discount rate to 7% and the Lombard rate to 8% in the same year, although even 
after this rise they remained around five percentage points below the market rate. In 
1885, when the stock of metal backing improved, the Bank decided to cut the discount 
rate to 6% and further down to 5%, in order to intensify its lending. A fresh outflow of 
gold, however, triggered another two rate hikes: to 6% in April and to 7% in August 
1885. Three months later, when the impending announcement of the Serbian-Bulgarian 
War threatened the level of the Bank’s metal backing, the discount rate rose once again to 
8%. The rate would have probably been raised even further up, but the issue of a silver-
backed banknote created scope for investment of the Bank’s resources. The spread 
between the rates on silver and gold loans was then introduced. Thus, in 1886, the Bank 
set the interest rate on discount in silver at 6.5%, while retaining the rate on discount in 
gold at 8%. 
 










































































































Capital (left scale) Profit (right scale)
Chart 6
Source: Statistical Yearbook of the Kingdom of Serbia (1913).
in million dinars in million dinars
 
   19
The interest rate on silver loans was cut to 6% in 1888 and further down to 5.5% 
in 1891. In the latter year, the interest rate on gold loans was reduced to 7.5%, as the 
Bank had sufficient gold reserves in its vaults. When the metal backing began to decline 
in the following year, however, the interest rate on gold loans was raised to 8.5% and that 
on silver loans to 6.5%. With the activation of the Bank’s share in a railway loan in early 
1893, the interest rate on gold lowered to 7.5%. The interest rate on silver loans lowered 
to 6% and remained at this level until end-1919. The interest rate on gold loans remained 
unchanged until 1904, when it was revised downwards to 6%, as a result of a rise in the 
Bank’s metal backing.  
 
The Discount Rate, 1884-1914









































































































































































































































































The Customs War with the Austro-Hungarian Empire (1906-1911) put a stop to 
Serbia’s years of peaceful development, causing disruptions in all sectors of the 
economy. Because of the intermediation of the government with the National Bank, the   20
Bank decided to breach the limitation on the issue of banknotes but only on a temporary 
basis. Total circulation thus ranged between 37 and 65 million dinars. The Annexation 
Crisis of 1908 represented the climax of the Customs War. Fears of war and the 
economic blockade by the Austro-Hungarian Empire plunged Serbia into a financial 
crisis. The Bank’s interest rate on gold loans rose to 8%, but the tension of the crisis was 
such that lending in gold had to be suspended throughout 1910 when gold in circulation 
reached sufficient levels again. The rate on gold loans was then cut from 7% and further 
down to 6% in 1911. In 1912, however, after the outbreak of Balkan Wars, the interest 
rate on gold loans increased to 7% and remained unchanged until 1920.  
 
The Lombard Rate, 1884-1914






































































































































































































































































Source: Monograph of the National Bank 1884-1934 (1935).
 
 
In an effort to lower the market interest rate, the Bank also resorted to 
administrative measures. Thus, in 1891, the Bank lent to money bureaux conditional upon 
their setting their interest rates at the following maximum levels: 8% if they had been 
operating for three years, 9% if they had been operating for two years and 10% if they   21
had been operating for one year. Such measures, however, failed to yield the desired 
results. A similar thing happened in 1908, when, in a bid to bring interest rates down, the 
government enacted a law on the extension of privilege, requesting money bureaux to set 
their interest rates at no more than 3 percentage points above the Bank’s interest rate if 
they wished to use the Bank’s loans. Out of 84 bureaux with which the Bank operated, 
only 44 consented to such limitation to the level of the interest rate. Consequently, in late 
1909 the National Bank did business with only 54 bureaux or 30 less than in 1908. The 
market interest rate remained unchanged, while a large number of bureaux found it more 
profitable to borrow with larger Belgrade bureaux or abroad, at a higher interest rate than 
that offered by the Bank, but with no limitations regarding the interest rates charged to 
their clients. 
As seen in Figures 7 and 8, a simple inspection of the trend movements of the 
Bank rate and the market rate reveals that, except in the first two years of the Bank’s 
operations, the discount rate for silver loans ranged between 5.5% and 6.5% (most often 
moving at 6%), while the market rate varied widely, and sometimes was as much as two 
times higher than the Bank rate. A question is thus raised: Why the National Bank kept its 
interest rate practically unchanged for so long (1891-1920). Let us quote the following 
explanation provided by the Bank’s management: “When setting the discount rate, the 
management of the Bank considered all the consequences of raising and lowering the 
country’s official interest rate, with a special emphasis on safeguarding the Bank’s metal 
backing and encouraging the inflow of short-term foreign capital.  At the same time, 
however, the Bank’s management had to take equal, if not even greater, care of the 
country’s emerging financial market and to endeavour keeping the prevailing market 
interest rate as low as possible, as its legally defined objective. Special circumstances in 
the domestic money market required that the Bank’s credits extended by the issuing 
institution should be cheaper than the credits extended by other money institutions. For 




                                                 
6 Monograph of the National Bank 1884-1934 (1935, p.59).   22
3. The National Bank: the Issuer 
To achieve its primary objective of promoting domestic lending activity, the 
National Bank was granted the exclusive right to issue banknotes. “The right to issue 
banknotes at an amount of 2.5 times higher than the Bank’s metal reserves lies on the 
benefits that the issuing institutions bring to the country as well as on the profitability of 
the operation of issue. By issuing banknotes and lending them at a low interest rate to 
domestic business entities and traders, the issuer, i.e. the National Bank, increases 
domestic capital. In other words, it achieves the objective of promoting trade and 
economic activity by providing access to cheap capital and viable credit arrangements.”
7 
The main feature of money issue before World War I was bimetallism – a 
monetary standard in which two metals, gold and silver, were used to back the nation’s 
currency. At first, the idea was to issue only banknotes redeemable in gold, but as they 
could not remain in circulation, it was abandoned and silver-backed banknotes were 
issued again. The Bank issued banknotes against both gold and silver backing, but the 
value of gold-backed banknotes in circulation was negligible compared to the silver-
backed ones, which grew from year to year. Immediately after being put into circulation, 
the silver-backed banknotes became the main mean of payments, so when we talk about 
banknotes in circulation, we are actually referring primarily to the silver-backed ones. 
 
100-dinar gold-backed banknote. When founded in 1884, the National Bank was vested 
with the authority to issue 100-dinar gold-backed banknotes, and later also 50, 500 and 
1,000-dinar gold-backed banknotes.
8 The Law read as follows: “All banknotes placed 
into circulation shall have backing in gold and other securities, both trade-related and 
financial, that can easily and safely be converted into gold. … The Bank shall never place 
more banknotes into circulation than 2.5 times the amount of gold it holds in its vaults. 
                                                 
7 Моnograph of the privileged National Bank of the Kingdom of Serbia 1884-1909 (1909, р.144).  
8 On the eve of the First Serbian-Turkish War, the state coffers were badly in the red and there was an 
initiative to issue national paper money. In January 1876, a decision was enacted to issue paper money. 
This money was printed in July 1876, but it was never placed into circulation. Instead, the matter was 
resolved through foreign and domestic borrowing.    23
No more than one quarter of gold can be replaced with silver, either”.
9 However, the 
banknote was not overly well received and did not remain in circulation for long; instead, 
it was immediately converted into gold. Such non-acceptance was because banknotes 
were never used before in the domestic money transactions, their denomination was too 
high and the Agio was on gold.
10 
 
50-dinar gold-backed banknote. As the denomination of the 100-dinar banknote was 
too high, it was expected that a low denominated note, i.e. the 50-dinar note, would 
manage to remain in circulation. However, this banknote, placed into circulation in 
February 1885, was not well received too. Both 100- and 50-dinar notes were readily 
redeemed into gold. When it became apparent that neither of the two gold-backed 
banknotes could remain in circulation, the National Bank requested permission from the 
minister of finance to print 10-dinar gold-backed banknotes. This met with more 
opposition than expected, as the government intended to issue by itself banknotes of the 
same denomination.  
 
Silver-backed 10-dinar banknote. For almost a year, the Bank operated without making 
much headway. Its income was barely sufficient to cover its costs, while projections for 
1885 envisaged a balance of payments deficit. The Bank needed a banknote that would 
not be exchanged for metal and return to its vaults, but rather would remain in circulation. 
A very important political reason behind the introduction of a 10-dinar silver-backed 
banknote was the looming war with Bulgaria, which could not be waged with empty state 
coffers. As the government would not allow the issuing of low denomination gold-backed 
banknotes, the Bank accepted to issue a silver-backed 10-dinar banknote rather than to 
remain without a 10-dinar banknote altogether. This marked the beginning of bimetallism 
that continued to be the basis of Serbia’s monetary system until the end of World War I.  
                                                 
9 See, the Law on the National Bank, 1883. 
10 As the gap between domestic money and gold used for the settlement of international obligations 
widened, the Agio indicated the depreciation of the dinar against the value of gold.     24
The 1885 Law introduced a silver-backed 10-dinar banknote, prescribing that “the 
National Bank shall exchange its 10-dinar banknotes against silver, and its 50, 100, 500 
and 1,000-dinar banknotes against gold, at full nominal value without any deductions, as 
soon as the banknote is presented for redemption at its main cash vault. The Bank shall 
never place more banknotes into circulation than 2.5 times the amount of gold it holds in 
its vaults. No more than one quarter of gold can be replaced with silver”. 
Money issue was based on the principles of security and liquidity and due 
observance of the law. After initial setbacks occasioned by the mistrust in paper money 
and the size of the first banknote, the Bank’s operations stabilized as early as in late 1885. 
The legally prescribed minimum backing for banknotes in circulation was observed at all 
times. In the years of economic instability and agricultural downturn, the backing for 
circulating banknotes was significantly higher that was prescribed by the Law.
11 
The quantity of circulating silver-backed banknotes kept rising, by around 4 
million dinars per year, hence encouraging the National Bank’s lending activities. On 
average, silver-backed notes made up 95% of total circulating money supply. They were 
rarely converted into silver, and when they were, it was mainly due to the shortage of 
change money. As a result, silver-backed notes gained weight over gold-backed ones, 
which accounted for around 5% of total banknotes in circulation.
12 It might be concluded 
that money demand in domestic trade was mainly satisfied by silver-backed banknotes 
and silver coins (used exclusively as change money), and that gold coins, of which only a 
small amount was in circulation, were used for the settlement of international financial 
obligations.  
The circulation, as a rule, peaked in autumn, during the agricultural season. Any 
rise in circulation was usually followed by a rise in the Agio on gold, which came about 
because of a number of bad agricultural years, the high level of borrowing abroad, 
unsettled finances and adverse political circumstances. The Bank tried to prevent a rise in 
                                                 
11 After the Customs War with Austro-Hungary in late 1906, the backing equaled 74%; during the First 
Balkan War in 1912 it was 86%, whereas in the first year of World War I, it reached as much as 116%.  
12 In the period 1891-1900, the share of gold-backed banknotes in total circulating money supply equaled 
mere 1.48%, whereas in the period 1901-1910, it rose to 8.48%. The share of gold-backed banknotes 
reached the highest level in 1911 owing to the renewal of the trade agreement with the Austro-Hungarian 
Empire.    25
the Agio by selling gold for silver-backed banknotes, but it was accused of inducing 
money expansion, which was not used to finance the productive sectors of the economy. 
As the Agio was charged on gold purchased in exchange for silver-backed banknotes, the 
rise in the Agio was attributed to the large number of silver-backed banknotes in 
circulation. 
The National Bank intervened directly by selling gold in the foreign exchange 
market to preserve the stability of the domestic currency. The Bank did not eliminate the 
Agio, but it managed to smooth oscillations in the value of the currency. The Bank would 
purchase gold when banknote circulation was sufficiently high, usually during the 
autumn season, and would sell gold when circulation was low and when the Agio rose, 
which was usually in March. Direct interventions of the National Bank were particularly 
significant in the early 1890s, but at the same time, this measure was severely criticized 
by both the government and the public. In late October 1892, the Bank had to abandon its 
efforts to suppress the Agio amid accusations that such efforts resulted in the creation of 
the Agio itself. The government decided to take the matter into its own hands and 
resolved the problem by limiting the quantity of 10-dinar silver-backed banknotes in 
circulation. 
The 1885 Law, which introduced a new silver-backed banknote, set no limitations 
on the circulation of such banknotes, as their issue could equal two and a half times the 
stock of metal backing available to the Bank. The circulation of silver-backed banknotes 
remained unlimited until 1893, when the government came to interpret the Law as setting 
a limit on the issue of silver-backed banknotes at around 10 million dinars. In fact, the 
Bank and the government differed in their interpretation of the legal provisions relating to 
the metal backing of the money issue. The National Bank interpreted the relevant 
provisions as meaning that gold backing could be used for the issue of silver-backed 
banknotes. As a result, metal backing and currency in circulation came to stand in an 
inverse proportion: gold was prevailed in the composition of backing, whereas 
approximately 95% of silver-backed banknotes were in circulation (see Charts 9 and 10). 
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Total backing Gold banknotes
Silver banknotes Total circulation
Chart 9
Source: Monograph of the National Bank 1884-1934 
in million dinars
 
By contrast, the government maintained that gold might be used only as the 
backing for the issue of gold-backed banknotes, while the issue of silver-backed 
banknotes depended exclusively on silver backing. In practical terms, this meant that the 
authorized limit was already exceeded by 20 million dinars in silver-backed 10-dinar 
banknotes, as total circulation of silver-backed 10-dinar banknotes was around 30 million 
dinars in 1893. As the silver backing amounted to a mere 4 million dinars, only 10 
million dinars could be issued in silver-backed banknotes. 
The Bank opposed such interpretation, but in vain. It pointed out that “the Agio 
was not so much a consequence of the issue of silver-backed banknotes as of a poor 
international balance and a poor state of government finances; for the Agio to be 
eliminated and the currency to return to normal levels, overall economic conditions 
needed to improve“.
13 An analysis of the movements of the Agio and the quantity of 
silver-backed banknotes in circulation reveals that the Agio was at its lowest level when 
the circulation of banknotes was at its highest, and vice versa.  
                                                 
13 See, the monograph of the privileged National Bank of the Kingdom of Serbia 1884-1909 (1909, p.155).   27
The government, however, insisted that silver-backed banknotes should be 
withdrawn over a five-year period, and that only a third of all banknotes should remain in 
circulation. This could be done by cutting credits by 20% per year that the National Bank 
did, warning, however, of the fact that “the national economy would suffer greatly as the 










































































































































Gold Silver Foreign correspondents
Chart 10
Source: Monograph of the National Bank 1884-1934 (1935).
in million dinars
 
The deflationary policy took its toll on the practice of lending by the money 
bureaux and the economy practically came to a standstill. Despite constant sales of gold, 
the Agio peaked at 18% in 1894, as seen in Charts 11 and 12. The government eventually 
realised its mistake and, in 1896, restored the earlier practice according to which the 
metal backing for silver-backed banknotes could be either in silver or in gold. The 
amount of silver-backed banknotes, however, remained limited to 25 million dinars, 
regardless of the level of backing.  
 
 















































































































































































































































Note: Based on napoleon d'or movements.
Source: Monograph of the National Bank 1884-1934 (1935).
 
 
One of the proposed solutions to the problem caused by the Agio was the 
introduction of a 20-dinar gold-backed banknote. In 1896, the National Bank received 
the authorization to issue such banknote, but it did not do so until 1907 because it 
believed that the failure of the gold-backed banknote was not due to its high 
denomination only. Once the banknote was issued, however, it did not remain in 
circulation for a long time. In fact, it only entered into circulation during the exports 
season, once the limit on silver-backed banknotes was reached. There was no Agio at that 
time, and the gold-backed banknote circulated as the silver-backed one. During the 
exports season, its circulation thus reached close to 12 million dinars, but as the exports 
season would near its end, the circulation of gold-backed banknotes would dwindle 
notably.  
Soon, however, it became apparent that raising the limit on silver-backed 
banknotes in circulation to 25 million dinars in 1896 was still below the mark. In the next 
year, the financing of autumn agricultural works had been already suspended at the peak   29
of the season. Hence, in 1898, the limit increased to 30 million dinars, but remained 
unchanged until 1908
14 when the Law extended the National Bank’s privilege for another 
25 years and set the ratio of total circulation of silver-backed banknotes to the Bank’s 
subscribed capital at 1 to 5. That year, the subscribed capital of the National Bank 
equalled 7.5 million dinars in gold, which meant that the circulation of silver-backed 
banknotes could equal 37.5 million dinars or 41.2 million dinars if the government 
allowed a deviation of 10% above the maximum limit in vies of extraordinary 
circumstances. The extension of the National Bank’s privilege in 1908 was significant as 
the Annexation Crisis and fears of war exhausted the reserves of money bureaux. The 
Bank suspended lending in gold, but lending in silver continued owing to government’s 
assistance. The government took three main measures. First, it allowed the Bank to issue 
a contingent advantage of silver-backed banknotes (10% of total circulation or 3.75 
million dinars). Second, it allowed the Bank to lend 2.5 million dinars to the economy 
from the sum designated for discounting state coupons. Third, in order to suppress the 
Agio, it intervened in the foreign exchange market by selling 27,000 napoleon-d’ores. As 
a result, the Bank was able to increase the circulation of silver-backed banknotes to 43 
million dinars. These measures saved Serbia from a financial breakdown and helped it 
weather the crisis. The law on extending the Bank’s privilege envisaged that its total 
capital (10 million dinars) should be subscribed by 1913, which meant that, in that year, 
the circulation of silver-backed banknotes could reach 50 or 55 million dinars. 
                                                 
14 In the context of the Customs War with the Austro-Hungarian Empire, the government allowed the 
breach of the legal maximum and permitted the Bank to issue an additional 4 million dinars in silver-
backed banknotes.   30















































































































































The ensuing period from 1909 until 1911 was marked by economic progress. The 
economic upswing reached its peak in the year 1911. Substantial foreign capital entered 
the country through newly founded branches of foreign banks in Belgrade, while the 
circulation of silver-backed banknotes hit a high record of 59.2 million dinars in October 
and that of gold-backed banknotes reached as much as 19.5 million dinars. However, the 
economic advancement was once again halted by the outbreak of war in 1913. 
 
4. The National Bank: the Government Banker 
After the 1878 Berlin Congress, when Serbia became independent, and the 
subsequent proclamation of Kingdom in 1882, the government assumed substantial 
obligations and needed a strong monetary institution on which could rely. This was 
particularly clear after the collapse of the General Union which was supposed to construct 
railways in Serbia. The budget deficit continued rising and it became almost impossible 
for the government to strike a balance between budget revenues and expenditures. The   31
progressive government and the National Assembly thus considered the Bank as an 
institution to satisfy the credit requirements of both the private and public sectors. 
Therefore, the Bank’s lending activity took two main directions: private credits and 
credits to the government. 
Operations with the government were the first operations of the National Bank. In 
fact, it scarcely began operating with the government when it approved a loan of 300,000 
dinars against three-month state coupons, from the funds paid in for the Bank’s shares. 
The government continually relied on the assistance of the National Bank, which, in turn, 
always accommodated the government pursuant to legal regulations. “As a result, there 
was less money for financing trade and the economy, but the government needed 
financial assistance, too.”
15 In the period from 1880 till 1887, budget revenues equalled 
202.1 million dinars and expenditures 302.5 million dinars. The government owed 254.1 
million dinars in respect of “permanent” debts and 32.1 million dinars in respect of 
“temporary” debts.
16 The government financed the budget deficits by domestic 
borrowing, primarily from the National Bank, but by foreign borrowing as well. 
Regardless of the avenue of deficit financing, lending to the government invariably 
influenced the operations of the National Bank. 
Government borrowing from the National Bank can be divided into two periods: 
1)  from 1884 when the Bank was created, to 1903 and, 
2)  from 1904 till the outbreak of World War I in 1914.  
 
First Period: Government’s Indebtedness  
Facing constantly a budget deficit for over 25 years in a row (1878-1903), the 
government resorted heavily to borrowing from the National Bank. In 1884, the 
government discounted its coupons in exchange for a total of 900,000 dinars. By the end 
of the year, debt declined to 304,216 dinars. The share of government debt in total 
                                                 
15 Monograph of the Privileged National Bank of the Kingdom of Serbia 1884-1909 (1909, p. 127). 
16 In the 1880s, the government financed its budget deficit by means of so-called temporary short-term 
loans. Obligations in respect of these loans were maintained in a special extraordinary budget, which was 
offset by sources other than revenues. These were short-term government debts, which needed immediate 
settlement, as all other expenditures booked in the so-called regular budget.    32
currency in circulation thus came to 38.9%. In addition to discounting of coupons, the 
government contracted collateralized loans with the Bank. As soon as the 1885 Law on 
the silver-backed banknote was enacted, the government borrowed 1 million dinars from 
the Bank, placing as collateral the bonds remaining under the 1881 Law. In December of 
the same year, the government borrowed 500,000 dinars more. Its debt thus climbed to 
1.5 million dinars. Soon after, the government requested a new loan of 500,000 dinars. 
In fact, the Bank proved to be the ultimate option for financial excess government 
spending, as the war with Bulgaria virtually depleted the state coffers, while foreign 
credits were difficult to get and budget revenues were low and collected at irregular time 
intervals. The government floating debt to the Bank kept rising and the government paid 
only the interest and not amortisation. Two years after the start of the Bank’s operations, 
in 1886, government debt rose to 2.9 million dinars, representing more than 50% of the 
issued banknotes. In the period ahead, there was a relative decline in the share of 
government debt in total currency in circulation, owing to a faster increase in the quantity 
of issued banknotes. Thus, in 1888 government debt rose to 4 million dinars; this 
represented 28.9% of banknotes in circulation. 
In 1890, the debt to the Bank in respect of collateralized loans, coupons and the 
Bank’s share in government loans abroad reached close to 6 million dinars. The Bank 
also approved the so-called intermediate loans of total amount of 1 million dinars against 
government guarantees (to individual ministries, state institutions, railways directorate, 
the monopoly on tobacco, salt, public institutions, etc). The next year, direct and indirect 
government loans rose to 8 million dinars.    33
The Government Debt to the National Bank and Total 







































































































































Government debt to the National Bank  Total Circulation
Chart 13
in million dinars
Source: Monograph of the National Bank 1884-1934   
 
 
Until 1898, the government borrowed from the Bank pursuant to an agreement 
with the Bank’s management. However, since the repayment of its floating debt could not 
be effected from regular budget revenues nor postponed any longer, while an earlier 
government loan of 70.5 million dinars intended for this purpose could not be realized in 
Paris, the government issued a law on a temporary loan, thus binding the Bank to lend 10 
million dinars more. Silver-backed banknotes issued in respect of this loan should have a 
metal backing in the same proportion as provided for all other banknotes. However, they 
were not included in the maximum allowed contingent of 25 million dinars. 
The already high debt to the Bank doubled in 1889 reaching 15.9 million dinars, 
amounted to almost 50% of the banknote issue (see Chart 13). As the remaining half was 
to be used to purchase gold to cover issued banknotes, it becomes apparent that few 
money resources had eventually been left to finance trade and craftsmanship. As a result, 
the banknote contingent advantage rose to 30 million dinars.   34
Unsettled financial circumstances were indicative of the general state of affairs in 
the Kingdom. The divorce between King Milan and Queen Natalija, the abdication of the 
King, the frequent quarrels between the divorced spouses, rivalry and fight for influence 
over the underage heir Alexander invariably affected Serbian finances. The opportunism 
exhibited by political parties, which served primarily as political instruments to both 
Kings, Milan and Alexander, did not help in restoring the country’s financial situation in 
order. 
In 1900, another loan of 2 million dinars was approved in the same terms as those 
were applied to the earlier loan of 10 million dinars. Once again, the limit for currency in 
circulation was exceeded and metal backing was provided. The Bank’s dissatisfaction 
from the following quote: “Once a high-handed approach has been adopted, it is difficult 
to reverse the trend. This legal solution is enacted without requesting the opinion or the 
consent of the Bank’s management… Such legal solutions further eroded the Bank’s 
independence, compelling it to choose in a difficult situation: to breach the laws enacted 
without its consent and thereby to expose itself to forced measures … or to bend its head 
and apply the laws and decisions, and yet to protest against them. In general, the Bank 
opted for the second option, giving way before force“.
17 Therefore, the relations between 
the National Bank and the government remained strained well until the enactment of the 
1904 Law.  
In addition to government borrowing from the National Bank during this period, it 
is important to take into account the loans extended to municipalities, counties and 
districts for financing utility works.
18 
 
Second Period: Relations Re-defined 
 Pursuant the 1904 Law, the government was given the option to borrow from the 
Bank on a temporary basis by pledging state coupons in return for working capital worth 
up to 10 million dinars. All existing debts merged into a single debt, while the Bank was 
                                                 
17 Monograph of the Privileged National Bank of the Kingdom of Serbia 1884-1909 (1909, p. 130). 
18 For more information see, Kosijer (1924, p. 110) and the Monograph of the privileged National Bank of 
the Kingdom of Serbia 1884-1909 (1909, p.138-141).   35
vested with the authority to issue silver-backed banknotes in denomination of 50 and 100 
dinars. More importantly, the 1904 Law introduced an institutional framework for re-
defining the relations between the Bank and the government.
19 In particular, it was 
defined that government borrowing from the National Bank should be only temporary 
and short-term. The government should also finance a significant portion of its spending 
by foreign borrowing. The budget was struck after the change in the dynasty and when 
the Radical party headed by Mr Nikola Pašić came into power. The energetic radical 
minister of finance, Mr Lazar Paču, undertook rigorous measures to restore the health of 
Serbia’s finances. No doubt, the key contribution to this process also came from the strict 
supervision of all budget receipts and outlays implemented by the National Assembly, 
which used to discuss the state budget, item by item, for months. Running such carefully 
deliberated fiscal policy resulted in the reduction of the government floating debt, from 
7.52 million dinars in 1904 to 3.43 million in 1905, while in the following two years debt 
was nil. As a result, the Bank was able to implement successfully both credit policy 
measures and those aimed at stabilizing the dinar. 
However, the Customs War with the Austro-Hungarian Empire and the 1908 
Annexation Crisis in particular, brought about a financial crisis in Serbia. The 
government undertook a number of measures that saved Serbia from its financial 
meltdown and helped it come through the crisis. Pursuant to the 1908 Law, the 
government was given the option of additional borrowing from the Bank. Namely, the 
government was vested with the right to use temporary, three-month advance payments 
based on coupons worth up to 10 million dinars. In fact, however, it did not fully use this 
option until the outbreak of the Second Balkan War in 1913, but actually helped the Bank 
with the unfunded commitments under such credits in cases when the depletion of the 
Bank’s contingent threatened private lending activity. Well-regulated state finances 
enabled the government to set aside 2.25 million dinars from the amount earmarked for 
                                                 
19 Тhis is best illustrated by an excerpt from the speech of Lazar Paču in the assembly debate: “…the 
National Bank should not be a source of the government revenues. It may become such a source only 
indirectly: by creating conditions for encouraging development and providing viable credit arrangements, 
which will in return upgrade economic activity and trade, thus strengthening the primary sources of revenue 
to the state coffers”. See, the monograph of the National Bank 1884-1934 (1935, p. 38).   36
discounting regular coupons and transfer them to the National Bank in order to lend to the 
economy, preventing thus the suspension of silver credits.  
A special type of lending to the government was the so-called temporary 
exchange. Under this arrangement, the government could exchange gold in unlimited 
amounts with the National Bank against an appropriate amount of silver-backed 
banknotes and vice versa, and exchange silver-backed banknotes against gold without 
any deductions whatsoever. The banknotes issued in respect of temporary exchange were 
not included in the contingent advantage of 40% backing. This enabled the government to 
exchange gold against silver-backed banknotes without any losses of the Agio, regulating 
at the same time the gold market supply and strengthening the metal backing of 
banknotes. As proved later, this type of exchange allowed, above all, the simple and 
efficient financing of budget expenditures in difficult times.    
Economic activity gained momentum after the Annexation Crisis and events that 
shook the Balkans to the core. The progress achieved from 1909 to 1911, paved the way 
for the stabilization of state finances, and even the First Balkan War of 1912 did not 
disrupt it.  In the course of 1911, the government did not discount regular coupons. It 
used working capital, but repaid its debts on time, and often even earlier than due. Hence, 
its debt to the Bank equaled zero at end-1910. The same also happened in 1911 and 1912 
– the government debt disclosed in the Bank’s balance sheets was fictional as it 
represented transactions with coupons for working capital for the benefit of the economy.  
Economic upswing came to a halt in 1913 as a consequence of war distress and 
downturn in crop yields. Budget revenues declined and the government stepped up its 
borrowing from the Bank. On the eve of the First World War, the government debt was 
around 10 million dinars. The balance of temporary exchange stood at 47.8 million, while 
government claims in silver accounted for 25.3 million dinars thereof. Hence, net 
government liabilities before the start of the war equaled 32.5 million dinars. During the 
war, these liabilities recorded a notable increase, as huge budget expenditures were also 
financed by the funds provided by the National Bank. 
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5. Conclusion 
The National Bank’s success in the performance of its functions as a creditor, 
currency issuer and government banker was mainly determined by the state of 
government finances. Widening budget deficits compelled the government to seek 
additional sources of finance through borrowing at home and abroad, the former referring 
mainly to borrowing from the National Bank. This reflected not only on the level of gold 
reserves, but also on the stability of the domestic currency and the Bank’s lending 
activity. “The capital at its disposal was modest, and the Bank could not have achieved 
more than it did. Apart from this, the crucial thing was that the government itself 
excessively absorbed the National Bank’s treasuries. Indeed, until 1908, government 
borrowing from the National Bank was by far higher than the credit and debt of all 
Serbian institutions taken together”.
20 
However, it would be right to say that the National Bank was successful in 
carrying out its functions, especially in reduced circumstances in which it operated and 
the need for striking a balance between conflicting objectives. Through its lending 
activity, the National Bank contributed to the development of trade and the domestic 
economy in general, managed to maintain relative stability of the domestic currency and 
performed the role of a banker to the most demanding client, i.e. the government.  It 
would be right to wonder whether the government would have been able to operate at all 
and carry out its tasks without the help of the Bank on which it relied so heavily.
21 
Neither the government nor the National Bank could, however, escape the impact 
of either the Customs War or the Balkan Wars which were in fact only a prelude to the 
First World War. Peace and stability are a prerequisite for economic development and 
when we look at Serbia’s history from 1884 to 1914, all we see is a chain of wars:  first 
with Bulgaria in 1885, then in 1906-1911 with the Austro-Hungarian Empire (Customs 
War) which, albeit not an armed conflict, had a negative effect on the Kingdom of Serbia. 
The Balkan Wars in 1912-1913 came after and Serbia emerged as a winner. In such poor 
circumstances, the country, however, made significant economic headway, and the 
                                                 
20 Quoted Pera Maksimović at the 1913 central shareholders’ meeting, (see, Кosijer 1924, p.116). 
21 Milić (1994, p. 83).   38
National Bank did its best to achieve the goal it was set up to perform, which was to 
promote trade and economic activity by providing credits. 
 
 
   39
References 
Annual Report of the Privileged National Bank of the Kingdom of Serbia for 1884, 
March 29, 1885, Belgrade. 
 
Capie, F., C. Goodhart and N. Schnadt (1994). “The Development of Central Banking” in 
The Future of Central Banking: The Tercentenary Symposium of the Bank of England, 
ed. F. Capie, Ch. Goodhart, S. Fischer, and N. Schnadt, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, pp. 1–231. 
 
Dugalić, V. et al. (2004). National Bank 1884–2004, Yugoslav Review, Belgrade. 
 
Gnjatović, D. (2006). “ The Introduction of Limping Gold Standard in the Principality of 
Serbia”, in: Monetary and Fiscal Policies in South-Eastern Europe: Historical and 
Comparative Perspectives (Conference proceedings of the 1st meeting of the South-
Eastern European Monetary History Network), ed. R. Avramov and S. Pamuk, Sofia: 
Balgarska Banka Narodna, pp. 45–56. 
 
History of the Serbian People VI, (1982). Group of Authors, Belgrade: Serbian Literary 
Association.  
 
Kosijer, Lj. (1924). National Bank of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes 1884-
1924, Library “Banking”, Zagreb. 
 
Law on the National Bank of Serbia 1883, Serbian Newspapers, 19 January  1883, 
Belgrade. 
 Law on Amendments and Supplements to the Law on the National Bank of 6 January 
1883, Serbian Newspapers, 27 September 1885, Belgrade. 
 
Milić, D. (1994). “Monetary-Credit System in the Early XX Century Serbian  Economy”, 
in Serbia in the XX Century Modernization Processes, Belgrade. 
 
Моnograph of the Privileged National Bank of the Kingdom of Serbia 1884–1909 (1909), 
Belgrade: Davidovic Printing Works. 
 
Monograph of the National Bank 1884–1934 (1935), Belgrade: Institute for 
Manufacturing Banknotes and Coins Topčider. 
 
Radovanovic, B. (1998). 110 Years of the National Bank, 1884–1994. Establishment and 
Beginning of Operation of the Privileged National Bank of the Kingdom of Serbia, 
Belgrade: National Bank of Yugoslavia. 
 
Sojic, M. and Lj. Djurdjevic (2006). “National Bank of Serbia 1884 – 2006 - 
Establishment and Beginning of Operation”, in: Monetary and Fiscal Policies in 
South-Eastern Europe: Historical and Comparative Perspectives (Conference 
proceedings of the 1st meeting of the South-Eastern European Monetary History   40
Network), R. Avramov and S. Pamuk (eds.), Sofia: Balgarska Banka Narodna, pp. 
141–155. 
 
Sojic, M. and Lj. Djurdjevic (2007), “Dinar Exchange Rate in the Kingdom of Serbia 
1882-1914”, in The Experience of Exchange Rate Regimes in Southeastern Europe in 
a Historical and Comparative Perspective (Conference proceedings of the 2nd 
meeting of the South-Eastern European Monetary History Network), Oesterreichische 
Nationalbank, workshops no 13, pp. 303-329. 
 
Statistical Yearbooks of the Kingdom of Serbia, National Statistics Administration, 
Belgrade. 
 
Todorović, M. (1925). Our Economic Policy, part I: Economic Problems of Pre-War 
Serbia, Belgrade: Geca Kon Publishing House. 
   41
BANK OF GREECE WORKING PAPERS 
 
61. Hall, S. G., G. Hondroyiannis, P.A.V.B. Swamy and G. S. Tavlas, “A Portfolio 
Balance Approach to Euro-area Money Demand in a Time-Varying Environment”, 
October 2007. 
 
62.  Brissimis, S. N. and I. Skotida, “Optimal Monetary Policy in the Euro Area in the 
Presence of Heterogeneity”, November 2007. 
 
63. Gibson, H. D. and J. Malley, “The Contribution of Sector Productivity Differentials to 
Inflation in Greece”, November 2007. 
 
64.  Sideris, D., “Wagner’s Law in 19
th Century Greece: A Cointegration and Causality 
Analysis”, November 2007. 
 
65.   Kalyvitis, S. and I. Skotida, “Some Empirical Evidence on the Effects of U.S. 
Monetary Policy Shocks on Cross Exchange Rates”, January 2008. 
 
66.  Sideris, D., “Real Exchange Rates over a Century: The Case of Drachma/Sterling 
Rate”, January 2008.   
 
67.   Petroulas, P. and S. G. Hall, “Spatial Interdependencies of FDI Locations: A 
Lessening of the Tyranny of Distance?”, February 2008.   
 
68.  Matsaganis, M., T. Mitrakos and P. Tsakloglou, “Modelling Household Expenditure 
on Health Care in Greece”, March 2008. 
 
69.  Athanasoglou, P. P. and I. C. Bardaka, “Price and Non-Price Competitiveness of 
Exports of Manufactures”, April 2008. 
 
70.   Tavlas, G., “The Benefits and Costs of Monetary Union in Southern Africa: A 
Critical Survey of the Literature”, April 2008.    
 
71.  Chronis, P. and A. Strantzalou, “Monetary and Fiscal Policy Interaction: What is the 
Role of the Transaction Cost of the Tax System in Stabilisation Policies?, May 2008. 
 
72. Balfoussia, H., “An Affine Factor Model of the Greek Term Structure”, May 2008.       
 
73. Brissimis, S. N., D. D. Delis and N. I Papanikolaou “Exploring the Nexus between 
Banking Sector Reform and Performance: Evidence from Newly Acceded EU 
Countries”, June 2008.  
 
74. Bernholz, P., “Government Bankruptcy of Balkan Nations and their Consequences for 
Money and Inflation before 1914: A Comparative Analysis”, June 2008. 
   42
75. Oosterlinck, K. and U. R. Loredana “Multiple Potential Payers and Sovereign Bond 
Prices”, June 2008. 
 
76. Kossev, K. D., “The Banking Sector and the Great Depression in Bulgaria, 1924-
1938: Interlocking and Financial Sector Profitability”, June 2008.  
 
77. Buyst, E. and I. Maes, “The Regulation and Supervision of the Belgian Financial 
System (1830-2005)”, June 2008. 
 
78. Barisitz, S. “Banking Transformation (1989-2006) in Central and Eastern Europe – 
with Special Reference to Balkans”, June 2008. 
 
79. Lazarević, Ž., “Banking Performance in South-Eastern Europe during the Interwar 
Period”, July 2008. 
 
80. Apostolides, A., “How Similar to South-Eastern Europe were the Islands of Cyprus 
and Malta in terms of Agricultural Output and Credit? Evidence during the Interwar 
Period”, July 2008. 
 
81. Avramov, R. and D. Gnjatović, “Stabilization Policies in Bulgaria and Yugoslavia 
during Communism’s Terminal Years: 1980s Economic Visions in Retrospect”, July 
2008. 
 
82. Nenovsky, N., M. Ivanov and G. Mihaylova, “The Evolution of Bulgarian Banks’ 
Efficiency during the Twenties: A DEA Approach”, July 2008. 
 
83. Görmez, Y., “Banking in Turkey: History and Evolution”, July 2008. 
 
84. Ceca, K., K. Rexha and E. Orhan “Banking and Finance in South-Eastern Europe: 
The Albanian Case”, July 2008. 
 
85. Bordo, M. “Growing up to Financial Stability”, July 2008. 
 
86. Lazaretou, S. “Banking and Central Banking in Pre-WWII Greece: Money and 
Currency Developments”, July 2008. 
 